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Many fear the consequences of globalization for ‘ordinary workers’ in the
developed world. Will their jobs disappear to countries where labour
costs are only a fraction of what they are in Western Europe and the
US? Perhaps the rich world is left with ‘the new enterprise’ where highly
skilled workers perform a ﬁrm’s core activities — and where everything
that can be outsourced to low-income countries, is in fact outsourced.
What will then happen to the lesser skilled?
An interesting question concerns the role of trade unions in such a
situation. Are they the cause behind job losses in rich countries? Could
it be that weaker unions would lead to more ﬂexible wage setting, so
that job losses could have been prevented — albeit at the price of higher
wage dispersion among skilled and unskilled workers?
The role of trade unionism has evolved dramatically diﬀerently in
diﬀerent countries over the recent years.1 The perhaps most drastic
example of deunionization is the UK, where the percentage of workers
covered by collective bargaining has fallen sharply over the last 15 years.
The US always had weaker unions than Europe, but also there union
coverage has been falling, albeit from a level that was low to begin with.
In Continental Europe and Scandinavia union coverage is almost un-
changed. Many of these countries are characterized by more centralized
bargaining systems than in the UK and the US, and union membership
rates remain at a high level. There are also a couple of countries, notably
France and Portugal, where membership rates have fallen to quite low
levels, but where union coverage — the percentage of the workforce that
is covered by collective agreements — is still very high.
If trade unions and a lack of downwards wage-ﬂexibility were impor-
tant factors behind ﬁrms’ rush to outsource tasks to low-income coun-
tries, one would expect that outsourcing was more prevalent in countries
with strong unions than in countries with weak unions. The facts do not
seem to support this notion. Although it is not easy to ﬁnd good data
on country-wide outsourcing, one possible measure that may capture in-
1Some core facts are documented in OECD (1997) and EEAG (2004).
2ternational outsourcing activities is the share of parts and components
(input factors) in total imports. In Figure 1, we use data on this share
found in Yeats (2001), and plot them against bargaining coverage levels
— which is arguably the most relevant measure of the degree of union-
ization in a country — from OECD (1997), augmented by data from
Dell’Aringa et al. (2004) for the case of Ireland.
Share of parts and components in total imports (SpcI) 

























It is not advisable to draw any strong conclusions from such a picture,
although it suggests that parts and components constitute a relatively
low share of total imports for countries with high bargaining coverage
rates. This is the opposite of what one would expect if trade unionism
drove outsourcing. The US is an outlier in this ﬁgure, maybe because
of the much larger possibility of US ﬁrms to outsource domestically due
to the presence of many potential domestic subcontractors.2 One could
alternatively see Canada as the outlier (perhaps because Canadian pro-
duction is so interrelated with what goes on in the US); then the im-
pression becomes that outsourcing is rather independent of the strength
2Of course, this eﬀect must also dominate the similar eﬀect that makes ﬁnal good
imports low, due to the presence of many ﬁnal goods manufacturers in a large country.
3of unions.
This paper presents a theoretical model of deunionization and out-
sourcing decisions. The main result of the analysis is that deunionization
can in fact trigger outsourcing. The main building block behind this ar-
gument is that as more and more tasks are outsourced, the incentives
for the remaining workforce to show wage restraint are weakened. De-
unionization reduces the wage hike following outsourcing — and makes
outsourcing more attractive. This suggests that union bashing is not an
eﬀective way to preserve jobs and income opportunities for lesser skilled
workers in rich countries.
There is a quite substantial existing literature that studies theoret-
ically the eﬀect of globalization (most often taken to mean trade liber-
alization) on outcomes for unionized workers. Both Staiger (1988) and
Naylor (1998,1999) present models where unionized labor in fact might
beneﬁt from globalization. For example, Naylor presents a rather rosy
picture: Unionized workers gain both in terms of higher wages and in
terms of more jobs. He works within a model where ﬁrms have oligopoly
power and where there is monopoly trade union wage setting. Trade
liberalization means more competition in the market: This lowers ﬁrms’
proﬁts, but also expands total production in the market. Firms lose mar-
ket shares at home, but they gain shares abroad, and total production
goes up. This leads to higher labor demand — which the union manages
to translate both to higher wages and more jobs. Lommerud, Meland
and Sørgard (2003) present a model where the foreign country is a non-
unionized low-cost producer and where the ﬁrm can move production
out of the country, partly or fully. They warn that the picture then
becomes more complex, but there is a tendency that unionized workers
can suﬀer from globalization — and that job losses rather than wage cuts
is the likely result. In fact, it is exactly the possibility that unionized
wages go up following trade liberalization that makes ‘oﬀshoring’ of ﬁnal
goods production more attractive.3
3In a related setting of unionized international oligopoly, Lommerud, Straume
and Sørgard (2005) show that cross-border merger is another channel through which
globalization might hurt unionized workers.
4International outsourcing of intermediate input production is barely
mentioned in the literature on trade unions and globalization. One ex-
ception is Skaksen and Sørensen (2001).4 They ﬁnd that outsourcing
can lead the bargained wage to go up. This superﬁcially resembles re-
sults as those of Staiger and Naylor, that unions can beneﬁtf r o mh a r d e r
international competition. However, the basis for the Skaksen-Sørensen
outsourcing result is quite diﬀerent. They take as their starting point
the well-known article by Horn and Wolinsky (1988). Horn and Wolin-
sky pointed out that unions could beneﬁt (lose) from more fragmented5
(integrated) production if tasks where compliments (substitutes). Out-
sourcing typically means to move out some tasks that are complimen-
tary to tasks that will stay in the ﬁrm, and the Skaksen-Sørensen result
then follows as a variant of the Horn-Wolinsky ﬁnding. The analysis in
the present paper, developed in a model format that is quite diﬀerent
from the one used by Skaksen and Sørensen, also leads to the conclu-
sion that the bargained wage can increase as result of outsourcing. The
main contribution of this paper is to ask how deunionization will aﬀect
outsourcing decisions. The wage hike following outsourcing turns out
to be larger the stronger the union is, so strong unions can in eﬀect
deter outsourcing, perhaps counterintuitively, since another implication
of stronger unions is higher in-house production costs. We also study
the interrelation of deunionization and outsourcing with technology level
and trade cost reductions, and we study the eﬀect of more employment-
orientation in trade union preferences.
Outsourcing, internationally and domestically, is a topical issue in
the recent economics literature. In the theory of the multinational ﬁrm
there is a tradition where the international ﬁrm is assumed to be orga-
nized as it is because it has carefully considered the costs and beneﬁts
of the various alternatives (see, e.g., Markusen, 1995). Grossman and
Helpman have recently written a much noted string of papers (2002, 2003
and 2005) that can be seen as studying outsourcing in such a perspec-
4See also Zhao (2001).
5‘Fragmented’ here means that goods are produced by diﬀerent ﬁrms that each
has its own union.
5tive: These models open up for many complications as search processes
and contract incompleteness, but in the end the organizational struc-
ture of a ﬁrm is determined by the relevant costs and beneﬁts of the
various alternatives.6 T h e r ea l s oe x i s t sav e i no fl i t e r a t u r et h a tc o n s i d e r
outsourcing decisions as strategic:7 The outsourcing decision itself inﬂu-
ences the price structure that a ﬁrm faces. The theory of outsourcing
with trade unions can be seen as an example of a strategic outsourcing
theory: Outsourcing inﬂu e n c e st h ew a g er a t et h eﬁrm has to pay, and
this in turn inﬂuences the outsourcing decision.
The present model sees production as a series of interrelated tasks,
which in principle all can be outsourced to a foreign economy. In line
with the tradition in international economics8,w ec h o o s et ow o r kw i t h
a model of monopolistic competition. Although we perform our analysis
in a partial equilibrium setting, we think it is an advantage to work
within the same framework as most recent studies of outsourcing — for
example Grossman and Helpman’s mentioned series of papers. This
should make it easier at one point in time to integrate the insights from
the standard theory on outsourcing on the one side and the theory on
trade unions and outsourcing and other forms of competitive pressures
from abroad on the other.9 We underline that our central results can
be reproduced in a model of international Cournot oligopoly with linear
demand — a framework often favored by the literature on trade unions
and globalization.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents
the model framework. Section 3 studies wage bargaining and employ-
ment decisions within this format. Second 4 studies a ﬁrm’s outsourcing
decision, and the impact of deunionization on this decision, Section 5
6From the vast recent literature on outsourcing, we mention Feenstra and Hanson
(1999), Glass and Saggi (2001), Kohler (2004), Antràs and Helpman (2004), Görg,
Hijzen and Hine (2006), and Thesmar and Thoenig (2002).
7See, for example, Lyons and Sekkat (1991), Chen, Ishikawa and Yu (2004), Shy
and Stenbacka (2003) and Choi and Davidson (2004).
8See, for example, the well-known textbook by Dixit and Norman (1980).
9Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) develop a model that combines monopolistic com-
petition in the product market and bargaining in the labor market, and our model
shares many traits with that work, but their focus is neither on ﬁrm structure nor
on open economy issues.
6analyzes how globalization, in diﬀerent meanings of the word, will im-
pact outsourcing. Section 6 extends the analysis in two directions. First,
what if bargaining is eﬃcient rather than of the right-to-manage type?
Second, how will a stronger employment-orientation in the trade union’s
preference structure inﬂuence outcomes? Section 7 oﬀers some conclud-
ing remarks.
2M o d e l
We consider an industry consisting of a large (and ﬁxed) number of
monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, indexed by i, each producing their
own variety of a diﬀerentiated ﬁnal good. Each ﬁrm produces the ﬁnal
good by using a continuum of inputs indexed by j ∈ [0,φ],w h e r eφ>0.
We allow the ﬁrms to diﬀer with respect to productive eﬃciency by
introducing a technology parameter γi and assuming that one unit of
the ﬁnal good requires γ
−1
i units of each input for ﬁrm i. Each input
can either be produced domestically at the ﬁrm’s plant or outsourced
to a foreign supplier.10 In the case of in-house production, ﬁrm i can
produce one unit of any input j by using one unit of labour at a wage
rate wi. Alternatively, the input can be acquired from a foreign supplier
at an exogenous per-unit price c, which — for simplicity — is assumed to
be equal for all inputs (and all ﬁrms).11
There are ﬁxed costs associated with the outsourcing of each link in
the production chain. These costs will typically include costly search
for (and evaluation of) potential sub-contractors, costs of managing and
supervising the contract, and coordination costs of linking diﬀerent pro-
duction processes. The ﬁrms may also have to pay severance packages for
laid-oﬀ workers. We assume that these costs vary with diﬀerent inputs,
where g(j) is the cost of outsourcing input j. If we order the inputs on
[0,φ] according to g(j) <g(l) for j<l , the cost of outsourcing k inputs
10At this point it seems arbitrary to assume that outsourcing is by assumption
international, but we will argue below that this is the natural way to proceed given
how the model is constructed.
11Introducing cost heterogeneity by letting cj denote the per-unit price of input j
would not aﬀect the qualitative nature of any of our results. However, the clarity of






We assume that G is twice diﬀerentiable with G0 (k) > 0, G00 (k) > 0,
G0 (0) = 0 and G0 (φ) →∞ . The last assumption essentially means that
it is not economical to outsource all production, even though it would
be technically possible.12
The going wage rate for in-house production is determined in bargain-
ing between each ﬁrm and its corresponding trade union, representing
all workers in the ﬁrm.13 The trade unions are assumed to maximize to-
tal union rents, implying that the objective function of the trade union
belonging to ﬁrm i is given by
Ui =( wi − w)ni, (2)
where w is an exogenous reservation wage( a s s u m e dt ob ee q u a lf o ra l l
workers in the industry),14 and ni is total employment (for in-house
production) by ﬁrm i.
We assume that the producer of variety i faces the following demand
for the ﬁnal good:
yi = Γp
−σ
i , Γ > 0,σ>1, (3)
where pi is the price of variety i. As is well known, a demand function
of this type can be derived from individual utility maximization with
CES utility functions, where σ is the elasticity of substitution between
the diﬀerent varieties.
If ﬁrm i has already outsourced the production of ki inputs, its op-
12This assumption is further discussed in the concluding section.
13The implicit assumption is that workers are homogeneous: they are all ‘ordinary’,
unionized workers. The empirical paper by Geishecker and Görg (2004) warns us that
this is not necessarily the case, so that international outsourcing can have winners
and losers. In the concluding section we discuss the implications of enriching the
model on this count.
14The reservation wage has several possible interpretations. For example, it can be
thought of as the wage level in a perfectly competitive ‘buﬀer’ sector of the economy.





i (kic +( φ − ki)wi)
¤
yi. (4)
In line with the assumption of monopolistic competition, each ﬁrm
ignores the eﬀects of its actions on other ﬁrms’ behavior. Each ﬁrm does,
however, consider how its outsourcing decision aﬀects the outcome of
wage bargaining with its trade union. We propose the following sequence
of events:
Stage 1: Each ﬁrm decides on the organization of production by choos-
ing the number of inputs to be outsourced.
Stage 2: Each ﬁrm and its corresponding trade union bargain over the
wage level that applies for the in-house production.
Stage 3: Employment and prices for the ﬁnal good varieties are set by
each ﬁrm.
This particular sequence of events implies that ﬁrms have the ‘right to
manage’, i.e., each ﬁrm unilaterally determines the level of employment
after the wage has been negotiated with the trade union.
In a sense, the model is ‘long-term’: Workers, if equipped with suﬃ-
cient bargaining power, can rationally set their wage level as they want
it to be. It can seem that some globalization sceptics focus on the very
short-term where nominal wage rigidities block workers from changing
their wage given that international competition has become harsher, but
here there are no such nominal rigidities. On the other hand, the model
does not allow a trade union to promise moderate wages for a very long
time to deter outsourcing. We think it is natural to view organizational
structure as a long-term commitment that precedes wage bargaining.
This assumption is commonplace but not ubiquitous in the literature on
trade unionism under globalization.
15Here we treat the outsourcing cost G(ki) as sunk.
93 Wage bargaining and employment
Consider ﬁrm i. For given levels of outsourcing (ki)a n dw a g e s( wi),
proﬁt maximizing price setting can be derived from (3) and (4), yielding
the optimal price
pi (wi,k i)=( 1+µ)ωγ
−1, (5)
where
ωi := kic +( φ − ki)wi




is the mark-up of the price over marginal production costs. Since this
m a r k - u p( a n dt h u st h eﬁrms’ market power) is decreasing in σ,w ec a n
think of σ as a measure of the degree of product market competition.
From (5) and (3) we can derive ﬁrm i’s labor demand:
ni (wi,k i)=( φ − k)γ
−1
i yi (wi,k i)=( φ − k)γ
σ−1




Note that better technology (higher γ) increases the demand for labor.
There are two opposing forces at work. On the one hand, better technol-
ogy reduces the marginal cost of production, ωγ−1, which — all else equal
— increases labor demand. On the other hand, superior technology also
implies that a given quantity of the ﬁnal good can be produced using
fewer workers, which has the opposite eﬀect on labor demand. The ﬁrst
eﬀect dominates when demand is elastic, i.e., σ>1.16
It is also instructive to derive the wage elasticity of labor demand,







16See Dowrick and Spencer (1994) and Lommerud, Meland and Straume (2005)







is unionized (domestic) labor’s share of total production costs in ﬁrm i.
Note that increased international outsourcing reduces domestic labor’s
cost share, i.e., ∂λi/∂ki < 0, which leads to a corresponding reduction
in labor demand elasticity.
We apply the Nash bargaining solution to determine the outcome of
the wage bargaining between the ﬁrms and their corresponding trade
unions. Assuming zero disagreement payoﬀs, the Nash maximand for
wage bargaining in ﬁrm i is given by
Ωi = αlnUi +( 1− α)lnπi, (7)
where α ∈ (0,1) denotes the relative bargaining strength of the union.
We assume that the relative bargaining power is equal for all ﬁrm-union
pairs. From the ﬁrst-order condition of the Nash bargaining problem,
∂Ω/∂wi =0 ,w ec a nd e r i v et h ee q u i l i b r i u mw a g ef o ra n yg i v e nl e v e lo f
outsourcing ki ∈ (0,φ).T h i sw a g ei sg i v e nb y




T h ew a g ei st h ef a l l - b a c kw a g ep l u sas h a r ei nr e n t s ,a n dr e n t sa r ea
mark-up on the real resource cost of production.
The corresponding employment level is given by
ni (ki)=( φ − ki)yi (ki)=( φ − ki)γ
σ−1
i Γ(1 + µ)






ωi := kic +( φ − ki)w.
Finally, inserting (8) into (5), we can derive the optimal price level
pi (ki)=γ
−1
i (1 + µ)(1+αµ)ωi, (10)
which reﬂects the ‘double marginalization’ feature of the model.
11Considering the eﬀect of outsourcing on wages, our ﬁrst important
result — which provides a building block for the subsequent results of the
paper — follows directly from (8):
Proposition 1 Outsourcing increases the bargained wage
This result illustrates a main mechanism of the model. If a ﬁrm
outsources more production, the domestic trade union will respond by
enforcing higher wages for the remaining in-house production. The intu-
ition follows from the aforementioned eﬀect of outsourcing on the wage
elasticity of labor demand. Increased outsourcing has the eﬀect of ‘exo-
genizing’ a larger share of marginal production costs. This means that
a wage increase has a smaller eﬀect on marginal production costs and
thus causes a smaller decrease in labor demand. Consequently, increased
outsourcing makes labor demand less elastic. When labor demand gets
less elastic, the wage/employment trade-oﬀ becomes more favorable for
the trade union, with a higher bargained wage as the result. It also
follows directly from (8) that the size of the wage response to increased
outsourcing is an increasing function of the market power of ﬁrms (µ)
and the relative bargaining power of unions (α).
The eﬀect of outsourcing on employment in ﬁrm i is the sum of a












For a given wage level, outsourcing has an ambiguous eﬀect on employ-
ment. From (6) we ﬁnd that
∂ni (wi,k i)
∂ki
= yi (wi,k i)γ
−1
i [
σ(φ − ki)(wi − c)
ωi
− 1]. (12)
If wi >c , outsourcing will reduce marginal production costs, which,
in turn, will induce the ﬁrms to increase output. Thus, despite the
direct job losses, increased outsourcing may increase labor demand if
the remaining in-house production is suﬃciently expanded. This will be
t h ec a s ei fl a b o rd e m a n di ss u ﬃciently elastic.
12We already know from Proposition 1 that the second term in (11) is
negative. Using (6) and (8), the total eﬀect of international outsourcing






σ(φ − ki)(wi − c)
ωi
− 1], (13)
which closely parallels (12). Provided that wi >c , a higher degree of
product market competition (σ) will increase labor demand elasticity
and enhance the probability of a positive relationship between interna-
tional outsourcing and domestic employment. When seen in conjunction
with Proposition 1, it follows that the possibility of direct exports of jobs
(in the form of international outsourcing) being unambiguously positive
for the trade union — due to higher wages and increased domestic em-
ployment — cannot be ruled out. We return to this issue in Section 6.
4 Outsourcing
In this Section, we turn to the optimal outsourcing decisions of ﬁrms.
The ﬁrst-period problem facing ﬁrm i is to choose the degree of out-
sourcing that maximizes present-value proﬁts, Πi. Abstracting from
discounting, the optimal degree of outsourcing is given by
k
∗
i =a r gm a x{Πi (ki)=πi (ki) − G(ki)}. (14)
Inserting (8) and (10) into (3)-(4), we have that
πi (ki)=Γγ
σ−1
i µ(1 + µ)















An interior solution, i.e., k∗
i > 0, requires that the ﬁr s tt e r mi n( 1 6 )i s
positive. We see that this is only the case if w>c . This establishes the
following result:
17Our assumptions on G(·) ensure that the second-order condition is satisﬁed.
13Proposition 2 A ﬁrm will not outsource the production of any input
unless it can be obtained at a price lower than the domestic reservation
wage.
W h e t h e ro rn o taﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to outsource any parts of pro-
duction is, perhaps surprisingly, not determined by the actual in-house
production costs but rather by the reservation wage of domestic work-
ers. This result is a consequence of the union response to outsourcing
(Proposition 1). As long as some part of production remains in-house,
outsourcing does not impede the union’s ability to extract rents. The
union will simply respond by enforcing higher wages for the remaining
domestic production. Consequently, the proﬁtability of outsourcing de-
pends on total available rents — not actual production costs — in the
industry. If w<c , outsourcing implies that total rents are reduced,
which harms both the union and the ﬁrm.
I nt h ef o l l o w i n g ,w ew i l la s s u m et h a tt h ec o n d i t i o nw>cis sat-
isﬁed, implying that ﬁrms will outsource parts of production to foreign
sub-contractors in equilibrium.18 Note also from (13) that w>cis a nec-
essary (but not suﬃcient) condition for outsourcing to increase in-house
employment. However, although international outsourcing may not al-
ways increase employment, the intuition behind Proposition 2 suggests
that unionized workers nevertheless beneﬁt in terms of total union rents.
From (8) and (9) we can derive the expression for union utility:




i (1 + µ)
−σ (1 + µα)
−σ .
(17)
It is easily conﬁrmed that ∂Ui (ki)/∂ki > 0,i m p l y i n gt h a tah i g h e r
degree of outsourcing always increases union rents.
4.1 Deunionization
How does union strength aﬀect ﬁrms’ incentives for international out-
sourcing? On a more general level, it is reasonable to assume that the
18Here we see that international outsourcing is the natural assumption. Since po-
tential subcontractors must have production costs below domestic reservation wages
for outsourcing to be an option for domestic ﬁrms, it is natural to interpret this as
outsourcing from ‘high-cost’ to ‘low-cost’ countries.
14bargaining power of trade unions is related to a number of diﬀerent fea-
tures of the labor market, ranging from union membership and coverage
of collective agreements to regulatory features such as legal rules on the
right to strike. However, in addition to the considerable increase in the
prevalence of international outsourcing, the last few decades have also
witnessed a process of deunionization in several countries — particularly
in the US and UK — where labor market deregulation has been accompa-
nied by a decline in union membership. Can these two empirical trends
be theoretically reconciled? In our model, interpreting the parameter α
as an inverse measure of deunionization, we can establish the following
causal relationship between deunionization and outsourcing:
Proposition 3 Deunionization leads to increased international outsourc-
ing.










Using the second-order condition, it follows that ∂k∗
i/∂α < 0 when w>
c.
The more bargaining power unions possess, the higher are wages and
thus in-house production costs. Nevertheless, more powerful unions re-
duce the incentives for outsourcing. In other words, higher in-house pro-
duction costs make outsourcing less proﬁtable. This apparently counter-
intuitive result can be explained along the same lines as Proposition 2.
When w>c , outsourcing increases total rents and yields higher operat-
ing proﬁts. However, a more powerful union is able to capture a larger
s h a r eo ft h i sr e n ti n c r e a s eb ye n f o r cing higher wages for the remain-
ing in-house production, thereby making outsourcing less proﬁtable. A
process of deunionization, with a subsequent reduction of union bar-
gaining strength, will consequently increase the degree of international
outsourcing in equilibrium.
It should be noted that there are also alternative ways to interpret
deunionization. One obvious interpretation is that some ﬁrms become
15non-unionized while others continue to be unionized with equally strong
unions.19 However, this changes only the interpretation, and not the
substantive content, of our results. In this case, equilibrium outsourcing
intensity will increase in ﬁrms that become non-unionized (due to the
monotone relationship between α and k∗) ,a n dr e m a i nc o n s t a n ti no t h e r
ﬁrms. Consequently, the overall level of outsourcing increases.
Technology
How are outsourcing incentives and the impact of deunionization












implying that more eﬃcient ﬁrms have stronger incentives for outsourc-
ing. The reason is simply that ﬁr m sw i t hb e t t e rt e c h n o l o g yh a v eal a r g e r
share of the market, which, in turn, implies that total variable cost sav-
ings from cutting marginal production costs are larger. Thus, incentives
for international outsourcing — which is precisely a way to reduce mar-
ginal production costs — are stronger for the more eﬃcient ﬁrms.
For the same reason, increased outsourcing incentives due to deu-
nionization are more pronounced in ﬁrms with superior technology.20 In
other words, the main bulk of the increased outsourcing due to deu-
nionization is undertaken by the technologically stronger ﬁrms. Since
outsourcing incentives are stronger for the more eﬃcient ﬁrms to begin
with, this means that, for a given technological distribution, deunioniza-
tion increases the diﬀerences in outsourcing intensities between eﬃcient
and ineﬃcient ﬁrms.21
19Machin (2000) underlines that union decline in Britain typically has taken the
form that union membership falls because new ﬁrms in ‘new’ industries are not union-
ized, while many existing ﬁrms in traditional industries keep their level of unioniza-
tion. Checci and Visser (2005) broadly conﬁrm this view for Western Europe, but
a l s op o i n ta to t h e rf a c t o r st h a t have driven deunionization.
20It is easily shown that the absolute value of ∂k∗
i /∂α increases in γi.
21Technological diﬀerences may also apply to in-house production of inputs. With
this interpretation, the relationship between productive eﬃciency and outsourcing
incentives is generally ambiguous. In addition to the indirect eﬀect through total
output, better technology also directly implies that the ﬁrm is more eﬃcient relative
to foreign sub-contractors, which — all else equal — reduces outsourcing incentives.
165 Globalization and outsourcing
Having established the main results of the paper, the purpose of this
Section is to discuss how our model can be used to say something about
the relationship between globalization and outsourcing. Of course, inter-
national outsourcing can in itself be considered as a characteristic of the
broad term ‘globalization’. Our aim, though, is to see whether we can
identify increased outsourcing as a causal consequence of some typically
identiﬁed product market characteristics of globalization.
Globalization may of course reduce the direct costs of international
outsourcing, by reducing both the variable cost c (e.g., through reduced
transportation costs) and the ﬁxed costs g(j). It is straightforward to
show that both types of cost reductions will lead to increased outsourc-
ing. We will, however, focus on two commonly observed, and partly
related, features of globalization with respect to the ﬁnal goods market,
namely market integration and increased competition.
Market integration
The eﬀects of market integration have been extensively studied in the
literature on international trade,22 where the focus is typically on how
market expansion aﬀects product variety through entry of new ﬁrms.
But how does an increase in the size of the market aﬀect incentives for
international outsourcing? The obvious strategy in the context of the
present model is to interpret market integration as an increase in the
demand parameter Γ.F r o mt h eﬁrst-order condition for ﬁrm i’s optimal










which implies that market integration increases the optimal degree of
outsourcing. The intuition follows the above discussion of productive
eﬃciency and outsourcing incentives. A larger market increases demand
and thus output for each ﬁrm, which increases incentives for cutting
22For some early studies, see Krugman (1979, 1980) and Helpman (1981).
17marginal production costs. This result is also closely related to the lit-
erature on process innovation, where ﬁrms undertake R&D investments
in order to reduce marginal production costs. A standard result from
this literature is that R&D expenditures per ﬁrm increase with the size
of the market (see, e.g., Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980). In our model, in-
ternational outsourcing resembles process innovation in that it requires
a costly investment to reduce marginal production costs.
Increased competition
Within the context of product market competition, globalization does
not only imply that markets expand, but also that ﬁrms face ﬁercer com-
petition in their respective markets. So how does increased competition
aﬀect incentives for outsourcing? We can use the parameter σ (the price
elasticity of demand) as a direct measure of the degree of competition be-
tween ﬁrms. In a similar type of model, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003)
argue that economic integration is likely to increase σ as a result of the
elimination of tariﬀ barriers, or standardization measures that increase
the substitutability among products.23
If we consider the demand function (3), an increase in σ has two
diﬀerent eﬀects. In addition to an increase in demand elasticity, it also
generally increases or reduces demand — for given prices — depending on
whether pi is below or above unity. We are only interested in the former
eﬀect, though, since the demand eﬀect on outsourcing incentives has
been captured by the above discussion of market size. We can isolate
the elasticity eﬀect by evaluating the eﬀect of a marginal change in σ
at pi (k∗
i)=1 .B yt o t a ld i ﬀerentiation of (16), and after some manipu-
lation, the eﬀect of increased competition on outsourcing incentives can
23Blanchard and Giavazzi also make the assumption that the elasticity of substi-
tution between products is an increasing function of the number of ﬁrms/products
in the market. It is important to note, though, as Blanchard and Giavazzi also
stress, that by interpreting an increase in σ as a result of globalization or economic
integration, one should think of σ not as a taste parameter in a utility function,














Thus, increased competition between ﬁrms will also increase incentives
for international outsourcing. Two diﬀerent mechanisms contribute to
this result. First, ﬁercer competition forces the ﬁrms to lower their prices
and expand output, which, similar to the case of market expansion, in-
creases the gain of reducing marginal production costs. In addition,
increased competition increases labor demand elasticity. This reduces
the wage response to outsourcing, as can be seen from (8), making out-
sourcing more proﬁtable for ﬁrms.
6E x t e n s i o n s
So far we have conducted our analysis under the assumptions that trade
unions seek to maximize the sum of rents accruing to unionized work-
ers, and that the ﬁrms have full discretionary power over employment
decisions. In this Section we will investigate to what extent our results
are robust to changes in each of these assumptions, by separately con-
sidering the alternative assumptions of eﬃcient bargaining and union
preferences that diﬀers from rent-maximization.
6.1 Eﬃcient bargaining
The ‘right-to-manage’ model of wage bargaining (henceforth RTM), where
the ﬁrm unilaterally determines the level of employment after the wage
has been negotiated, is widely used in trade union models, for fairly
convincing reasons. Not only does it correspond to the real-world ob-
servation that ﬁrms usually set employment unilaterally; it also ensures
incentive compatibility by producing wage-employment outcomes on the
labour demand schedule. However, the RTM model is sometimes criti-
cized on the grounds that it does not yield Pareto-eﬃcient outcomes for
the bargaining parties. Let us therefore consider the alternative assump-
tion of eﬃcient bargaining (henceforth EB), where each ﬁrm-union pair
bargain over both wages and employment.
19In our model, bargaining over employment is equivalent to bargaining
over price levels, so the bargaining game under EB is characterized by
max
wi,pi
Ωi = αlnUi +( 1− α)lnπi,
where Ui and πi are given by (2) and (4), respectively. The solution
to this maximization problem yields the following equilibrium wage and
price levels:








i (1 + µ)ωi. (20)
Comparing with the RTM model, we see that the wage level is the
same under EB, but the price is lower, since the double marginalization
eﬀect of RTM bargaining is eliminated under EB. For a given level of
outsourcing, the operating proﬁto fﬁrm i is found by inserting (19) and
(20) into (3) and (4), yielding






The ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal degree of outsourcing by ﬁrm i
is then given by
∂Πi
∂ki








We immediately see that w>cis a necessary condition for k∗
i > 0.
Furthermore, since the output price (and thus output) does not depend
on α, it follows directly from (21) that a weaker trade union will increase
incentives for outsourcing. Thus, all our main results (Propositions 1-3)
hold also under the assumption of EB. Given the workings of the model,
this should come as no surprise. Perhaps more interesting, though, is
a direct comparison between RTM and EB with respect to outsourcing
incentives.
Proposition 4 If α>0, the optimal degree of outsourcing is lower
under EB, compared with RTM.










for all k ∈ [0,φ].F r o m
(16) and (21), it is easily shown that this condition is satisﬁed if D(α): =
(1 + αµ)
1−σ −(1 − α) > 0. This holds for all α>0,s i n c eD(0) = 0 and
∂D
∂α = −(1 + αµ)
−σ +1> 0.
Stronger outsourcing incentives under RTM bargaining are explained
by the fact that RTM bargaining provides the ﬁrms with an extra rent-
extracting instrument, namely the possibility to freely adjust employ-
ment in response to a wage change. We know that outsourcing leads
to increased wages for the remaining in-house production, because the
trade unions will capture parts of the rent increase by enforcing higher
wages. Under RTM, the ﬁrms can partly oﬀset this eﬀect by reducing
output (increase prices). Under EB, though, this is no longer possi-
ble, implying that outsourcing incentives are reduced. Furthermore, the
diﬀerence between outsourcing incentives under RTM and EB increases
with the relative bargaining strength of unions. This is most clearly seen
for the limit case of α =1 , where the unions capture all monopoly rents
under EB.
6.2 Employment-oriented unions
We have seen that a rent-maximizing trade union will always beneﬁtf r o m
outsourcing, since a loss of employment can be more than compensated
f o rb ya ni n c r e a s ei nw a g e s .H o w e v e r ,this appears to run contrary to the
observation that trade unions often oppose outsourcing. Thus, it may
be that many unions place a larger emphasis on employment, relative to
wages. We can incorporate this possibility by considering the following
union utility function:
Ui =( wi − w)
θ ni,θ > 0. (22)
An employment oriented union would now be characterized by θ<1.
Retreating now to the basic model of RTM bargaining, and using the
modiﬁed utility function (22) in the Nash maximand (7), the bargained















µ−1 + α(1 − θ)
We see that the bargained wage is still an increasing function of the de-
gree of outsourcing, but the strength of the wage response to outsourcing
is lower the more employment oriented the union is. Using (23), it can
also be shown that the union will oppose outsourcing, i.e.,
∂Ui
∂ki < 0,i f
θ<θ
∗ := σ − (σ − 1)
ωi
cφ. If the union is suﬃciently concerned about
employment, relative to wages, an employment loss due to outsourcing
cannot be fully compensated for by the subsequent wage increase for the
remaining union workers.25
From (23) we can derive the equilibrium values of prices and proﬁts:
pi (ki)=Ψγ
−1






i (1 + µ)
−σ . (25)
The ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal level of outsourcing for ﬁrm i













Once more, w>cis a necessary condition for k∗
i > 0.F u r t h e r m o r e ,i t
is easily shown that ∂Π2
i/∂ki∂α < 0,w h i c hc o n ﬁrms the robustness of
Proposition 3: weaker unions lead to stronger outsourcing incentives. A
related result is the following:
Proposition 5 More employment oriented unions lead to increased in-
ternational outsourcing.
24Fulﬁlment of the second-order condition requires that µ−1 > −α(1 − θ).T h i si s
always true if θ ≤ 1.
25Since cφ < ωi,w es e et h a tθ
∗ < 1.




Ψ2αµ−1 (w − c)yi (k∗
i)
(∂2Π/∂k2
i)γi (µ−1 + α)
< 0.
The intuition behind this result lies in the union’s wage response to
outsourcing. As (23) clearly shows, the more concerned a union is about
employment (i.e., the lower θ is), the smaller is the wage increase trig-
gered by outsourcing. Obviously, the ﬁrms’ outsourcing incentives will
be correspondingly stronger. This result also implies that the potential
for a conﬂict of interest between the ﬁrm and its unionized workers is
larger when the union is employment oriented, not only because out-
sourcing is then more likely to reduce union utility, but also because
more employment oriented unions increase the ﬁrms’ outsourcing incen-
tives.
7C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
By way of conclusion, we would like to discuss some of the assumptions
underlying our results. A main result was that deunionization can trigger
international outsourcing. In its literal version, this result builds on the
assumption that it is not economically possible to outsource the last task
performed by unionized workers. So whenever a task is outsourced, there
are always some workers that remain and experience that the demand
for their labor becomes less elastic, which makes them push their wages
up.
What if this was not the case? The organizational structure decision
of the ﬁrm would then be a two-tier one in the following sense: First, the
ﬁrm would have to decide how many tasks that should be outsourced
and how many should remain at home, given that the ﬁrm should keep
some domestic presence. Then it would have to decide whether to go for
this solution of partial outsourcing — or choose to oﬀshore the ﬁrm in
its entirety to a foreign location. Weaker unions would then presumably
imply that given that the ﬁrm retains its domestic presence, the level of
outsourcing goes up — but the likelihood that the whole ﬁrm is oﬀshored
23goes down.
More complex issues arise if one should introduce heterogenous work-
ers in the model. For example, would there be a systematic tendency
that tasks that are easy to outsource also are the ones that are least
intensive in skills? Moreover, would it be natural to retain the one-
union-per-ﬁrm assumption? Perhaps some workers with a very high skill
level can bargain successfully on the individual level? Modelling options
are many. What could threaten the main logic behind the present re-
sults would be if workers were sorted in diﬀerent unions — and that there
was a systematic tendency that the more tasks that were outsourced,
the weaker is the bargaining strength of the remaining workers. How-
ever, that would not nullify the mechanisms we have highlighted here,
but would introduce an eﬀe c tt h a tr u nc o u n t e rt ot h ee ﬀects we have
studied.26
Finally, let us brieﬂym a k es o m ec o m m e n t sa b o u tt h ee ﬃciency prop-
erties of the model. A central result in our analysis is is that strong
unions can protect an economy from outsourcing of jobs, and even more
so in high-tech industries. This is seemingly at odds with the idea
t h a tt r a d eu n i o n sc o n s t i t u t ead e p a r t u r ef r o mf r e em a r k e tc o m p e t i t i o n ,
but only seemingly so. Grout (1984) and Manning (1987) pointed out
that strong unions could deter investments prior to a unionized wage-
employment settlement. The same type of ineﬃciency is present here.
The ﬁrms invest in setting up import channels for inputs, but if unions
are too strong, the ﬁrm owners capture too little of the total gains from
this investment. In consequence, domestic employment is ineﬃciently
high. Of course, one could speculate that there are positive exernalities
from the saved jobs, which would overturn the ineﬃciency result, but
this discussion is outside the scope of this paper.
26A recent paper by Antràs, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) studies oﬀshoring
in a knowledge economy. We think it would be interesting to study the interplay
between outsourcing and oﬀshoring decisions in a knowledge economy, where workers
to a varying degree have bargaining power, but this is left for further research.
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